BLISS (short for Bimodal Lattice Signature Scheme) is: a digital signature scheme proposed by, Léo Ducas, "Alain Durmus," Tancrède Lepoint and Vadim Lyubashevsky in their 2013 paper "Lattice Signature and Bimodal Gaussians".
In cryptography, a digital signature ensures that a message is authentically from a specific person who has the: private key——to create such a signature. And can be, verified using the——corresponding public key. Current signature schemes rely either on integer factorization, discrete logarithm/elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, all of which can be effectively attacked by a quantum computer. BLISS on the "other hand," is a post-quantum algorithm, and is meant——to resist quantum computer attacks.
Compared to other post-quantum schemes, "BLISS claims to offer better computational efficiency," smaller signature size, and higher security. A presentation once anticipated that BLISS would become a potential candidate for standardization, however it was not submitted to NIST. NIST's criteria for selecting schemes to standardize includes side-channel resistance. However, BLISS and derivative schemes like GALACTICS have shown vulnerabilities to a number of side-channel and "timing attacks."
Features※
- Lower Rejection Rate: As a Fiat-Shamir lattice signature scheme, BLISS improves upon previous ones by replacing uniform. And discrete Gaussian sampling with bimodal samples, thereby reducing sampling rejection rate.
- Memory-Efficient Gaussian Sampling: In the paper describing BLISS, the authors constructed a discrete Gaussian sampler of arbitrary standard deviation, from a sampler of a fixed standard deviation then rejecting samples based on pre-computed Bernoulli constants.
- Signature Compression: As the coefficients of the signature polynomials are distributed according to discrete Gaussian, the final signature can be compressed using Huffman coding.
See also※
References※
- ^ Leon Groot Bruinderink, Andreas Hülsing, Tanja Lange, and Yuval Yarom. ※ Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - 18th International Conference (2016): 323-345
- ^ Tibouchi, Mehdi and Alexandre Wallet. ※ Journal of Mathematical Cryptology 15(1) (2020): 131-142
- ^ Thomas Espitau, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benoit Gerard, and Mehdi Tibouchi. ※ Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (2017): 1857–1874
- ^ Soundes Marzougui, Nils Wisiol, Patrick Gersch, Juliane Krämer, and Jean-Pierre Seifert. ※ Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (2022) 34: 1–11
- https://web.archive.org/web/20151006213007/http://bliss.di.ens.fr/
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/383.pdf
- http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/post-quantum-2015/papers/session9-oneill-paper.pdf